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I. Introduction
The Corrupt Practices Act (CPA or "the Act")' has created some serious,
but manageable, problems for United States-based multinationals and has
certainly resulted in the loss of some sales. A White House task force address-
ing itself to the appropriately named subject of export disincentives con-
cludes the CPA is one, and attributes $1 billion in lost sales directly to the
Act.
The moving force behind this legislation, of course, was the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) and specifically its voluntary disclosure pro-
gram conceived in 1975, under which registered corporations were en-
couraged to voluntarily conduct internal investigations into questionable
payments and publicly report the results. This led to the disclosure festivals of
1976 and 1977 and as of today about 520 companies responded. One nondis-
closure in connection with the SEC program was its determination to refer all
company reports and documentation to a fraud unit of the Department of
Justice for criminal investigation.
Foreign bribes, of course, were and are not peculiar to United States com-
panies. Canada, our good friend to the north, whose ethical standards are at
least as high as ours, advised Canadian companies that bribes were necessary
to get foreign business, and certain of its Crown corporations have been
found to have engaged in a pattern of accommodative foreign law violations.
A recent article in Stern magazine estimates that German companies last year
paid $250,000,000 in bribes to get foreign business. Senator Proxmire re-
cently and publicly complained that German and Japanese trading compa-
nies in particular engage in the bribery of foreign officials to the disadvantage
of both American and multinational corporations of other countries. Bel-
gium, of course, permits a tax deduction for "secret commissions" which are
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378 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
payments in connection with Belgian exports to foreign persons to get busi-
ness. The recent and dramatic upsurge in Korean and Japanese construction
contracts in the Middle East and particularly Saudi Arabia may be part of this
picture or, perhaps better, mosaic.
This is not a brief in support of such activities but it is recognition that such
transactions are not limited to the United States or even the so-called under-
developed third world countries. Moreover, one finds that United States
companies are acting responsibly, even scrupulously. American lawyers are
being asked to provide the analysis, advice and assurances to American busi-
ness so that it may effect foreign sales in compliance with the Act. This, of
course, is not easy because the Act is complicated, vague and without any
current judicial interpretation.
Part of the problem, a large part, is that questionable transactions are not
limited to scrutiny under the anti-bribery provision or by the SEC or the
Department of Justice. These matters have also attracted, even excited, the
interests of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), the Treasury Department, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) and even the Federal Maritime Commission. The statutes
which must be considered include, obviously, the Securities and Exchange
Act of 19342 and specifically the disclosure, bribery and accounting sections,
the Internal Revenue Code, the Robinson-Patman Act,3 and the Federal
Trade Commission Act 4 as well as such criminal statutes as mail and wire
fraud, false statements, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, anti-racketeering,
and the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.5
The types of transactions encountered involve, for the most part, other
country or third-country agency payments, overinvoicing distributors, split
payrolls, and local law compliance matters.
For purposes of perspective in this discussion, it is perhaps helpful first to
consider the disclosure aspects of questionable payments. Disclosure under
the securities laws is keyed into the concept of materiality. Previously, this
was thought to mean financial statement materiality, that is, for example, if a
substantial portion of corporate revenues are based on bribe payments, say
five percent or ten percent, then disclosure is required so that shareholders
and investors may make an informed judgment as to the business risks of the
enterprise. There soon evolved, however, a second aspect of materiality, un-
related to financial statement materiality, and that is the quality or integrity
of management. The SEC position was and is that if a senior officer autho-
rizes foreign bribes that fact in itself is material to a shareholder in evaluating
management.
This then brings us to an analysis of the CPA itself. In summary, the CPA
prohibits corrupt payments by (1) United States issuers or domestic concerns,
'15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
315 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
'15 U.S.C. § 41-51 (1976).
131 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121, 1122 (1976).
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or (2) officers, directors, shareholders, employees or agents of United States
issuers or domestic concerns; to (1) foreign officials, (2) foreign political
parties, or (3) any person while knowing or having reason to know all or part
will be paid to foreign officials or foreign political parties; in order to (1) ob-
tain or retain business or (2) direct business.
The Act does not contain any monetary limitation or materiality standard
either in terms of the amount of the payment, the business related thereto, the
effect on the consolidated financial statements, or the related line of busi-
ness.
II. Definition of Terms
A. Corruptly
Both the Senate and House Reports defined this term to mean an "evil"
intent to "induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to
wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client or to obtain preferential
legislation or a favorable regulation." These rather dramatic statements are
to be contrasted with the SEC's position set forth in SAR No. 242 that "a
negligence standard will govern civil injunctive actions brought to enforce the
Act." 6
B. Payments
Payments include money or other "things of value" which benefit the
recipient or, by reference to the ALI model code, persons or entities "in
whose welfare he is interested" such as, presumably, a beloved son, wife or
nephew or, perhaps, his favorite charity or medical school.
Promises to pay, contractual or otherwise, even if not consummated, are
clearly covered by the Act and the concept was applied in the recent civil
injunctive action, SEC v. Katy Industries.7
C. Issuers
Issuer means the SEC registrant and the legislative history makes clear
foreign subsidiaries (and afortiori foreign joint ventures) are excluded. How-
ever, the legislative history also makes clear that the United States parent may
have vicarious liability for the acts of the foreign subsidiaries if it "engages in
bribery of foreign officials indirectly through any other person or entity." 8 In
this connection, the Senate Report states that "the bill would not cover pay-
ments by foreign nationals acting solely on behalf of foreign subsidiaries
where there is no nexus with U.S. interstate commerce or the use of U.S.
mails and where the issuer . . . had no knowledge of the payment. ' 9
'SEC. Act Release No. 242.
'Unreported Consent Decree, N.D. Il1. 1978.
'CONFERENCE REP. No. 95-831, at 14.
'S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11.
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D. Domestic Concerns
Non-SEC registered companies are also covered by the antibribery prohi-
bition as demonstrated by the very recent and first criminal case brought by
the Justice Department in U.S. v. Kenny International Corp., 'I but it is also
significant that the definition of domestic concerns applies not only to United
States companies incorporated in or having its principal place of business in
the United States but also includes "any individual who is a citizen, national
or resident of the United States."'
E. Officer, Employee
Officers of issuers have criminal exposure if they acted "willfully," a term
which has had a wide variety of definitions applied to it in a securities context,
ranging from simply doing the act which constitutes the violation to realizing
the act or omission is wrongful under the securities laws but nonetheless
proceeding deliberately and intentionally to act or fail to act. In a criminal
context, the term may be subsumed in a finding of corrupt action.
An employee's liability is also predicated on a finding of willfulness but,
unlike an officer's, his liability arises only if the issuer is found to have vio-
lated section 30A(a).
F. Foreign Official
The phrase clearly applies to officers and employees of the executive (in-
cluding military), legislative and judicial branches of foreign governments,
but also applies to any person "acting in an official capacity for or on behalf
of" a foreign government, department, agency or instrumentality. A recent
injuncture action would seem to include an uncompensated honorary consul
appointed by a foreign government and based in the United States Consul-
ate.II Techncial advisors and public sector agents also may fall within this
category. In SEC v. Katy Industries, '" moreover, the SEC complaint is capa-
ble of being construed to apply to officials of state-owned instrumentalities,
in that case, an official of Pertamia, the Indonesian state-owned oil com-
pany.
G. Reason to Know
This phrase is undefined, has been described as too vague for a criminal
statute, and former Secretary Blumenthal expressed "wonderment" as to its
meaning. Each of the three SEC and Justice Department cases brought under
the antibribery provisions sheds no light on its meaning since the allegations
all involve direct, active and knowing participation in a bribe.
'Unreported Consent Decree, D.D.C. 1979.
"See United States v. Holly & Carver, Unreported Consent Decree, S.D. Fla. 1979.
'SEC v. International Sys. & Control Corp., Unreported Consent Decree, D.D.C. 1979.
'Supra note 7.
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In my opinion, however, the phrase is qualified by the word "corruptly"
and therefore requires a finding that an issuer consciously disregarded known
facts evidencing a substantial likelihood that a bribe would occur. (Bear in
mind however, the SEC statement that a negligence standard applies in civil
injunctive action. "4) These facts, based on the experiences derived from the
voluntary disclosure era, include: (1) the size of the payment; (2) the nature
of the services; (3) the relationship of the recipient to the government con-
tractor; (4) the method of payment; and (5) concealment features masking a
foreign law violation, in other words, is the involvement of an intermediary
and/or the full amount of his compensation hidden from the foreign govern-
ment? Where one or more of these are present, it is clear that the United
States issuer or domestic concern has a duty to investigate and satisfy itself
that a bribe is not about to occur. Obviously, the due diligence procedures
must be adequate and reasonable in the circumstances and a commensurate
response to the kind and number of factors giving rise to the concern.
H. Business Purpose
The legislative history of the Act clearly supports the proposition that the
business purpose test was added in order to limit the applicability of the anti-
bribery provision to those situations where a payment was intended to in-
fluence the placement of government contracts. The language of the statute,
however, is loose and is capable of being construed as applying, for example,
to payments to obtain visa permits for employees which if not otherwise
available would foreclose a company from performing services in that coun-
try.
I. Facilitating Payments
These are payments to low-level government employees whose duties are
essentially ministerial and clerical, the purpose of which is to get them to do
what they are supposed to do. They are best understood in a context of
expediting the processing of forms and applications. There is another cate-
gory of payments which does not appear to be covered by the Act and that is
the so-called entertainment or goodwill expenditure, made with the general-
ized expectation of promoting goodwill but not directed in consideration of a
specific act in connection with a particular transaction. Unlike facilitating
payments, many countries, but not all, do not consider such payments to
violate local antibribery laws.
J. Accounting Provisions
These provisions have not received the publicity that the antibribery provi-
sions have, but for SEC registered companies they are more significant in
terms of immediate and pervasive impact. The accounting provisions were
intended to complement the antibribery section by requiring accurate recor-
"See note 6 supra.
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dation of transactions so that bribes would not be concealed or disguised on
corporate books, and by imposing on management a requirement to establish
a system of internal accounting controls that would prevent the creation of
off-book slush funds.
The SEC has implemented these provisions by adopting rules that outlaw
false entries and lying to accountants, and it has proposed rules requiring a
management certification in public documents that their system is suffi-
ciently adequate to assure compliance with the law. Management also would
be required to disclose any weaknesses in the system whether material or not,
or corrected or not. Businessmen, accountants and lawyers have filed an
unprecedented 1,000 comment letters in response to this latter proposal sub-
stantially all of which express vigorous opposition to its adoption.
In conclusion, our Congress has determined to criminalize the biblical in-
junction to "do good and avoid evil" and we as lawyers have the burden and
challenge to assist corporate America in effecting sales abroad in full com-
pliance with these laws.
